Dancing Dictators

Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Wannabe Donald Trump

Donald Trump had lots of admiring things to say about Xi Jinping after their recent summit meeting in Beijing. Xi was much less effusive about his visitor. Trump had barely returned to the U.S. when Xi welcomed Vladimir Putin and extolled China’s closeness and friendship with Russia. As the host, Xi had decisively reached primus inter pares among global autocrats.

What is the meaning of these summits?

Let’s look back on the superpower summits between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s, the Cold War years. Global tensions were great, especially over the status of Berlin, divided by a wall and considered the potential trigger for a nuclear confrontation. In time Berlin receded as a threat, but arms control remained the main focus of negotiations, with human rights a continuing issue for the U.S. side.

Never much discussed at these summits was trade or business. The fact is, there was barely any to consider: some grain sales, a Pepsi-Cola franchise, and Most Favored Nation status for the Soviets, which was predicated on the level of Jewish emigration.

Trump’s state visit to China in May, already a fading memory in our maelstrom of events, was mostly about business — or, more pointedly, about money. Tech moguls accompanied the president to Beijing. Whatever deals were agreed matter little in the great scheme of things, in which Trump and Xi parried over tariffs, chips, and rare earth materials, in search of advantage.

The United States, Russia, and increasingly China are fully armed with weapons that can demolish the globe in minutes. The consensus seems to be that the seemingly intractable wars in Ukraine and the Middle East can be essentially overlooked because it turns out that Xi, Putin, and Trump can’t figure out how or whether to resolve them.

So they default to other issues, rather than consider the possible annihilation of the human race.

In the 1970s, the U.S. and the Soviets achieved what was called détente, which meant that the depredations of the superpowers — the war in Vietnam and Soviet forays of various kinds around the world — could be tolerated. China was not competitive yet, and Washington and Moscow were content to let Beijing evolve in its own way, without interference of any consequential kind.

Now China is genuinely powerful. Russia is diminished in most respects but all the more dangerous because of Putin’s messianic aggression and those nuclear weapons he has, no longer being monitored by treaties.

There is also the matter of Donald Trump’s peculiar attitude toward Putin and Xi. He wants to be accepted in their realms of power, but the real dictators seem to doubt he will ever succeed. The result is Trump’s pirouettes, his challenges and flattery, and his threats and then backing down, which actually have little lasting impact on the great subjects of the day: technology, economic competition, and modern versions of war, especially in cyberspace.

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There was one significant development in Trump’s sojourn to China. In his confusing, contradictory, and ignorant way, he exacerbated the most contentious U.S.-China issue: the future of Taiwan.

Berlin was the potential flashpoint of the Cold War. Had the Soviets moved to take over West Berlin, conflagration would have definitely resulted. This did not happen because strategic and diplomatic decisions by successive leaders, on both sides, gradually reduced the likelihood.

When I visited Taiwan in 2023, my conclusion was that the issue was simmering but would not explode because of the clarity of the U.S. position in defense of the island — a laboriously devised message of support for Taiwan and signals to China that a takeover attempt would be more trouble for Xi than he needed to have at that time.

A New York Times headline in 2026 summarized the new reality:

“U.S. Support for Taiwan Now a ‘Negotiating Chip’ with Beijing.”

The gist is that Trump was evasive about Taiwan’s outstanding request for $14 billion worth of air defense systems, anti-drone equipment, and missiles critical to the island’s defense.

From his pinnacle of power, Xi has left no doubt how much he wants Taiwan to be reunited with China, sooner rather than later. How would he accomplish this? His record of triumph over Hong Kong — a combination of pressure, patience, and global acquiescence — could be his ultimate means.

But what if he decides that Donald Trump would bob-and-weave at Chinese aggression, as he has done with Russia in Ukraine and with Israel in Gaza and the West Bank. The twenty-first-century version of Mutual Assured Destruction in a nuclear war has become MAD from an economic collapse, the stabilizing factor in maintaining a superpower balance.

I have a friend who is an expert on Taiwan, with decades of experience in both Republican and Democratic administrations. To preserve what access is possible now, I’ll quote him without further identification:

Trump’s handling of Taiwan during his Beijing trip was a major setback for US Asia policy, worrisome not only for Taiwan but also for allies including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines.

Xi spent hours feeding Trump his view on Taiwan. Now Trump has bought it and repeats it as doctrine: “China has controlled Taiwan for thousands of years; Lai Ching-te is actively moving toward declaring Taiwan independence; all cross-strait tension is the fault of the separatists in Taiwan.”

After being brainwashed Trump now says these things publicly as the facts about Taiwan. He says he is delaying a decision on the latest arms purchase as a very good bargaining chip. In reality it may not be true leverage since Beijing insists we agreed to phase out arms sales in the unfortunate 1982 joint policy communique.

Using Taiwan arms sales as a chip with Beijing is unprecedented and violates the commitments of the Taiwan Relations Act. This administration has been quietly asking our Asian allies to be clear on what they would do in the event of an attack or blockade on Taiwan. Now they will wonder if we are committed to Taiwan.

Xi has framed our new relationship as “constructive strategic stability.” Trump seems to have embraced that slogan. The classic Chinese negotiating strategy is to get your opponent to agree to a framework concept. The opponent soon realizes that he has stepped into quicksand. The Chinese use the framework to veto everything they dislike. In this case, Beijing will use it to veto arms sales and other interactions with Taiwan they dislike.

The only solace is the senior figures in the administration with any influence and most of the Congress will in many ways continue to operate as if nothing has changed. Even the arms package could (probably will) be cut up and notified to Congress piecemeal by the State Department. And everyone including Xi Jinping knows that Trump can change his mind tomorrow. But the damage has been done.